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The Inspector General as an Aid to Law Enforcement

 

 

            As the Inspector General (“IG”) of the New Jersey Department of Transportation I run the Office of the Inspector General (“OIG”).  The OIG is comprised of two units – The Internal Investigation Unit (“IIU”) and the Office of Internal Audit (“OIA”).

            Independence of the OIG is central to the success of OIG’s mission. The Principles and Standards for Offices of Inspector General, prepared by the Association of Inspectors General, of which I am a member, emphasizes the need for the Inspector General to be independent.  Specifically, the Principals and Standards state:

The inspector general is responsible for establishing and maintaining independence so that OIG opinions, conclusions, judgments, and recommendations will be impartial and viewed by others as impartial.  The inspector general and OIG staff should consider not only whether they are independent and whether their own attitudes and beliefs permit them to be independent, but also whether there is anything about their situation which might lead others to question their independence.  All situations deserve consideration since it is important that the OIG be as independent as possible and impartial in fact and in appearance. (emphasis supplied).

 

In practice throughout many jurisdictions, and by statute in some, not even an agency head can prevent or prohibit the Inspector General from initiating, carrying out or completing any investigation or audit.  See, e.g., 5U.S.C.A. App. 3, Section 8G (d).

On January 11, 2005, Gregg Friedman, Inspector General of the U.S. Treasury Department and Vice-Chair of the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency, stated that “Inspectors General are critical to responsible government operations… We in the IG community hold the taxpayer’s proxy and must help to assure that their government is working for them in the most efficient and economical way possible.”

Vice-Chair Friedman summed up my view of the OIG perfectly, stating:

Each Inspector General, whether at the local, state or federal level, faces unique challenges, all dependent upon the nature and mission of their respective offices.  However, we all share certain common objectives:  1) provide senior management, legislative bodies, and the public with an independent set of eyes and ears to follow the actions of our departments and agencies; 2) bring to justice those attempting to defraud the government; 3) investigate other serious wrongdoing in the administration of government; and, 4) serve as independent fact finders in high profile, sensitive matters as they may arise.  Additionally, we should strive to identify opportunities for improving program performance, reducing costs and increasing operational efficiency.  I believe that the “value added” service we provide to our government and the successes we achieve can be best measured by whether or not we have changed the behavior of those responsible for the programs we review.

 

          As IG I have been true to this mission statement.

 

               Confidentiality is central to the work of the OIG and so I am not at liberty to divulge the specifics of individual investigations and audits.  I can, however, note that as IG I coordinate and consult with various Federal and State law enforcement and auditing officials in pursuit of our common objectives of honest and efficient government operations.  In this connection, as IG I joined in presenting a joint antitrust seminar with a senior trial attorney from the United States Department of Justice.  The purpose of the program was to sensitize New Jersey Department of Transportation employees to methods for detecting and prohibiting bid practices that might corrupt the competitive environment of the government contract bidding process.

               The seminar noted the following specific elements to consider when examining bid submissions for any irregularities

·        whether the bid(s) met technical requirements;

 

·        whether the bid was reasonably close to the engineer evaluation of cost to complete the job;

 

·        how did the bid compare with historical bid data;

 

·        the monetary disparity of all bids on the contract;

 

·        the relationship among all bidders;

 

·        are line items identical among any bidders or off by the same percentage;

 

·        handwriting on all bid submissions;

 

·        pre-qualifications of bidders;

 

·        does one bidder submit bids for other bidders;

 

·        do the faxed correspondence headers of various bidders resemble one another, and

 

·        does a losing bidder end up as the subcontractor for the winner.

 

               Collaborative efforts with other law enforcement agencies are ongoing.

  We receive materials and videos to assist in our fraud detection work.

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Hon. Robert R. Salman is IG of the New Jersey DOT and is a Member of the Board of Directors for the Respect for Law Alliance, Inc.

 

 

 

PRESS RELEASES - 2006

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE:
June 7, 2006

GOVERNOR CALLS FOR ASSEMBLY TO FOCUS ON EXPANSION OF DNA DATABANK BEFORE END OF LEGISLATIVE SESSION


Joined By Father Who Awaits DNA Database Expansion to Solve the Brutal Rape of His Daughter

Governor George E. Pataki today called on the Assembly Majority Leadership to allow its members to vote on his All-Crimes DNA Bill, which would allow New York State to fully harness the power of DNA technology so that New York State’s law enforcement officials could solve crimes, prevent crimes, exonerate the innocent and bring justice to crime victims.

The Governor was joined by Michael Canavan, whose daughter was brutally raped in May 2000, in Manhattan. The same, as-yet-unidentified man committed a similar rape in the Bronx in 2001. There is DNA evidence linking the same man to each rape, yet no name has been connected with the DNA.
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“How much longer will they wait? How many more rapes and other violent crimes must occur before we adopt this common-sense approach to fighting crime? It is only a matter of time before we have an All Crimes DNA Databank. The only question is: how many violent crimes will occur before that day? The Assembly Majority must allow this legislation to come to a vote,” Governor Pataki said. “We must not wait another moment to fully harness DNA technology here in New York State, so that our hard-working law enforcement officials have the tools to solve more crimes, prevent more crimes, exonerate the innocent and bring justice to crime victims.”

“Experience has shown that criminals convicted of lower- or mid-level crimes have committed, or will commit, more serious and violent crimes. By collecting a DNA sample from less than one-third of all criminals in New York State, we are letting career criminals run free. And while the State Senate has been a great partner in supporting the expansion of a full Databank, which would go a long way towards more fully employing this proven, powerful crime-fighting tool, the Assembly Majority Leadership has refused to allow the bill to come up for a vote, despite overwhelming bi-partisan support,” the Governor added.

Michael Canavan, whose daughter was brutally raped in May 2000, said, “As the father of a daughter who was brutally and violently raped, I do not want another woman to endure the physical and mental suffering that our daughter has been through. I do not want another parent to experience the hardship and sadness that my wife and I have lived with over the past six years. Each week we wait for our daughter’s assailant to be apprehended and brought to justice. Each time I contact the District Attorney’s office, I am informed with optimism, the case will be solved through DNA. However, in reality, this case might very well have been solved already if the DNA Databank had been expanded, as so often has been discussed.”

“My interest is not politics. However I am a strong believer in justice! The DNA technology we have available to us today is invaluable in solving more crimes faster and with greater certainty, than any other time in our history. I unequivocally support Governor Pataki’s legislative proposal expanding the use of the existing DNA Databank to include all criminals. Using a 20th century fingerprint process to prosecute criminals in the 21st century will significantly continue to limit the effectiveness of our law enforcement agencies. Let us grasp this opportunity, right now, by enacting the Governor’s proposal,” Mr. Canavan added.

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Gerald J. Turetsky, Chairman for the Committee on Civil and Criminal Justice Respect for Law Alliance, Inc. said, “It’s time for the New York Legislature to remove restrictions on DNA that has protected dangerous criminals and destroyed too many innocent lives. Although New York’s criminal population of 1.5 million have their fingerprints on file in Albany, ninety percent are not in the DNA databank because all but a small fraction of criminals are shielded from providing DNA samples. Limiting New York’s DNA databank to ten percent of criminals to protect the privacy of the other ninety percent makes no sense. Because of restrictions on taking DNA samples, most DNA evidence left at rape and murder scenes languishes for years without matches, despite repeated arrests of rapists and other violent recidivists. This is the year for New York to reclaim its hard earned reputation as the nation’s leader in criminal justice reform and crime reduction. It’s time for New York to remove all restrictions on DNA sampling.”

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Getting Terror’s

Number

National security letters help the FBI

discover conspirators before it's too late.

 

 

BY JAMES J. ROTH

 As the Feb. 3 deadline approaches for Congress to renew the USA Patriot Act, one investigative technique drawing particular scrutiny is the use of national security letters. These letters allow the Federal Bureau of Investigation and other intelligence community agencies to obtain certain information held by third-party record keepers without search warrants.

 

I am very familiar with this particular investigative tool. I served in the FBI for 25 years, more than half of that time as the chief   counsel of the New York office, the largest field office in the bureau. While there, I was responsible for reviewing and approving all national security letters issued by the assistant director in charge of that office.

 

I thus know firsthand that many of the current objections to the letters reveal a lack of knowledge and perspective. National security letters are not a dangerous threat to civil liberties, as some claim. Rather, they are a vital law enforcement tool that is necessary in the ongoing defense against terrorism. Congress, and specifically the Senate, should approve renewal of this tool in the form approved by the conference committee that considered the renewal of the Patriot Act last year.

 

THEY’RE NOT NEW

 

National security letters are demands for records. They are issued only by the FBI and other authorized intelligence community agencies. The FBI can use them only in national security investigations. They cannot be used in traditional criminal cases. National security letters can be directed only to three types of third-party record holders—financial institutions, wire and electronic communications service providers, and credit reporting agencies.

 

They can be used to obtain only limited types of records, such as financial records, telephone toll records, and the names of telephone and Internet service subscribers. Contrary to two New York Times editorials that exemplify the confusion and misinformation in this debate, the letters cannot be issued to obtain  medical records. The information sought is the type of information (such as phone records on whom a suspect is calling routinely) that would identify and connect conspirators, whether in organized crime or in international terrorism networks.

 

National security letters are not a new tool created by the Patriot Act. Congress first provided the FBI with the authority to use national security letters to request records from financial institutions in the Right to Financial Privacy Act of 1978. This statutory authority was amended in 1986 to require recipients to comply with FBI record demands pursuant to national security letters.

 

The Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 added the authority to use a national security letter to demand transactional and subscriber records held by wire and electronic communications service providers, which can include libraries offering Internet access to the public.

 

In 1995, amendments to the Fair Credit Reporting Act authorized issuing national security letters to credit bureaus to obtain names and addresses of financial institutions at which a consumer maintains an account, as well as to obtain the consumer’s address and employment information. To protect against compromising disclosures of these investigations to foreign powers and their agents, Congress has always imposed secrecy requirements on the recipients of these requests.

 

THE PATRIOT ACT

 

After Sept. 11, Congress provided additional national security letter authority in the Patriot Act to deal with terrorism. Congress required consumer reporting agencies, after a written request from a government agency authorized to investigate international terrorism, to furnish a consumer report of a particular consumer, as well as all other information in a consumer’s file.

 

The Patriot Act also amended requirements for issuing national security letters. Previously, to issue a letter, the FBI had to certify that there were specific and articulable facts giving reason to believe that the records sought pertained to a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power. This standard limited the value of the letters, because the records sought often contained the very facts agents needed to make the connections that would allow them to draw the conclusions necessary to make the required certification.

 

The Patriot Act changed this standard. Now the certification is that the information sought is believed to be relevant to an authorized investigation to protect against international terrorism or clandestine intelligence activities. The amendments also authorized senior FBI executives in all field offices to issue letters, and it prohibited issuing letters solely on the basis of activities protected by the First Amendment. These changes have made national security letters a more valuable investigative tool, which is reflected in the reported increase in their use.

 

NOTHING EXTRAORDINARY

 

To place the FBI’s authority in context, it is useful to compare national security letters to grand jury and administrative subpoenas. These are criminal investigation tools that the FBI cannot use in national security cases. The FBI can issue administrative subpoenas in drug, child pornography, and health-care fraud investigations.

 

Assistant U.S. attorneys issue grand jury subpoenas. Agency officials issue administrative subpoenas. Both kinds of subpoenas compel any source of information to produce nonprivileged documents and tangible objects.

 

Both kinds of subpoenas are issued without prior judicial approval. In fact, there is no judicial involvement unless a recipient challenges the subpoena or refuses to comply, and the government must go to court for enforcement. Absent a privilege, subpoenas will be enforced if there is any reasonable possibility that the material sought will produce information relevant to the investigation.

 

In contrast, national security letters can be used only in national security investigations. They are issued by senior FBI executives. They are more limited than subpoenas because they can be directed only to a limited set of information sources for certain types of records. As with subpoenas, the records sought must be relevant to the investigation.

 

A comparison with the existing subpoena authorities in criminal investigations demonstrates that the more limited authority to compel production of records in national security cases is nothing extraordinary. National security letters let FBI agents countering threats to national security have the similar ability to obtain information (from a limited class of record holders) that FBI agents investigating criminal cases, including domestic terrorism, routinely obtain through either grand jury or administrative subpoenas.

 

NONDISCLOSURE

 

Some criticize and oppose national security letters because there is currently no explicit mechanism for challenging them and because of the nondisclosure provisions that restrict the ability of recipients to inform the subjects of the investigation about the letters. But there has always been an implicit legal right to challenge a national security letter, and refusal to comply with such a letter would require the government to ask a court to enforce it.

 

These issues are clarified in the proposed new statute. The 2005 conference bill reauthorizing the Patriot Act amends the law to provide explicit procedures regarding challenges to and enforcement of national security letters and nondisclosure requirements. This bill passed the House but was filibustered in the Senate. Only a temporary extension of the original Patriot Act passed, and now Congress is again facing the disputed issues.

 

The conference bill establishes a procedure whereby a recipient of a national security letter can petition for an order modifying or setting aside the request. The bill also establishes a process for the government to move for judicial enforcement of the letter, and it lets a court impose sanctions for contempt if a recipient fails to comply with a court order to enforce a letter.

 

While the conference bill reiterates the prohibitions on disclosure, it explicitly allows for disclosure about the letters to obtain legal assistance. It also specifies that the recipient can petition for judicial review of the disclosure prohibitions immediately after the receipt of the letter. If the prohibition on disclosure is upheld, the recipient may petition yearly for another judicial review of the nondisclosure requirement. All of these changes make sense.

 

CONNECTING THE DOTS

 

After Sept. 11, the FBI was excoriated for, among other things, failing to aggressively collect and connect the dots.  In July 2001, an FBI special agent in Phoenix sent a communication to FBI headquarters expressing concern about the number of subjects of investigative interest attending flight schools in Arizona. The agent speculated about the possibility of a coordinated effort by Osama bin Laden to send students to civil aviation schools in the United States.

 

After Sept. 11, the FBI was characterized as bumbling and bureaucratic because it did not respond by ordering an immediate, dragnet-style, nationwide canvass of flight schools to identify Arabs and others from the Middle East and investigate why they were taking flight lessons. Yet now, when the FBI issues national security letters to a library to identify users of a particular computer, it is criticized as being intrusive and insensitive to privacy and constitutional rights.

 

Critics speculate that the FBI may be abusing the Constitution or compiling electronic dossiers on our reading and Internet references. Such fears are unfounded, and the proper remedy for any law enforcement abuses is to punish the culprits severely, not to remove or severely restrict valuable investigative tools.

 

Moreover, none of these criticisms speak to the possible reasons for issuing these national security letters. Perhaps the FBI is trying to identify an individual who used that library computer to communicate with a terrorist cell. With an Internet service provider, maybe the FBI is seeking to identify a foreign agent using the provider’s facilities to advance plans to harm the nation.

 

In 2004, the FBI agents took aggressive efforts in Las Vegas to identify possible terrorists in response to threat information that placed the nation on heightened alert. Yet these efforts were criticized by many in the same quarters who accused the FBI of failing to boldly pursue the Phoenix flight school theory before Sept. 11.

 

There should be no room in this important debate for uninformed speculation and misinformation. Authority for national security letters as amended by the Patriot Act is a necessary tool that is critical to the FBI’s ability to identify all elements of the threats to the nation from international terrorism.

 

The proposed new statute, as shown by the conference report, contains reasonable provisions for the protection of civil liberties. Critics who want more stringent requirements need to explain why international terrorists deserve greater procedural protections than those given to organized crime figures. And why do foreign agents need more protections from investigation than child pornographers or health care fraudsters?

 

These critics seek to impose overly stringent standards that are not required by the Constitution and are not necessary to protect constitutional rights. If they succeed, it will impede the FBI’s ability to protect the nation from future attacks.

 

In the debate over the reauthorization of the Patriot Act, those seeking to reinstitute unnecessary restrictions or, in the name of civil liberties, enact restrictions that would provide terrorists sanctuary in libraries need to remind themselves of the horror of Sept. 11.

 

James J. Roth is a retired FBI special agent and member of the information committee of the Society of Former Special Agents of the FBI. He is also a member of the adjunct faculty at Fordham Law School in New York.

© 2006 ALM Properties Inc. All rights reserved. This article is reprinted with permission from Legal Times (1-800-933-4317 • LTsubscribe@alm.com • www.legaltimes.com).

 

James J. Roth is a Founding Director of the Respect for Law Alliance,Inc., a 501(c) (3) Not-for-Profit Civic Corporation and a member of its Committee on Civil and Criminal Justice.

 

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This article may be fairly excerpted, quoted from or copied with credit to the “Respect for Law Alliance, Inc.” 445 Park Avenue, 9th Floor, New York, NY 10022.

The opinions expressed herein are those of the author and not necessarily those of the Respect for Law Alliance, Inc.

 

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